Considerable attention has been given to young British Asian Muslim identity in recent years. Whilst much of the literature has addressed the diasporic and transnational nature of British Muslim identity there has been a growing recognition of the need to address the national context in which this identity is formed. However, there is still a comparative lacuna of information about how religion features in the internal dynamics of this grouping, particularly the gender dynamics involved in the articulation of British Muslim men and women's identities.This article presents extracts from discussions with young British Asian Muslim men and women to explore how religion is mobilized as a power resource in the construction of their gender identity. It discusses how the mobilization of religion is often ambivalent, contradictory and intersected with other social differences, particularly class. The article uses Bourdieu's concepts of capital and field to explore the respondents' interviews.
Introduction
A great deal of attention has been given to young British Asian Muslim 1 identity in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the 'war on terror'. Whilst much of the literature has addressed the diasporic and transnational nature of British Muslim identity (Ahmed and Donnon, 1994; Huntingdon, 1993; Werbner, 2000) there has been a growing recognition of the need to address the national context in which this identity is formed (Abbas, 2005; Modood et al., 1997) . However, there is still a comparative lacuna of information about how religion features in the internal dynamics of this grouping, particularly the gender dynamics involved in the articulation of British Muslim men and women's identities. British Asian Muslim identities are usually seen as constructed in relation to culture, religion and ethnicity (Ramji, 2005) . This article presents extracts from discussions with young British Asian Muslim men and women to explore how religion is mobilized as a power resource in the construction of their gender identity. It discusses how the mobilization of religion is often ambivalent, contradictory and intersected with other social differences, particularly class.
2 By exploring the intersections between religion, gender, ethnicity and class it looks at how boundaries of masculinity and femininity manifest themselves and can be understood. In so doing it hopes to extend the research focus on Asian Muslim identity beyond established agendas. The article uses Bourdieu's concepts of capital and field to explore the respondents' interviews. It is suggested here that the mobilization of religion is reflective of the type of Islam these young men and women perceived as most useful and valuable as capital in the social field they occupied as a result of their gendered positioning.
The Research
The research reported on here forms a small part of a three-year project exploring social change amongst Britain's South Asian communities, which began in 2003. The recognition of internal (community, religious, class, spatial and gender) differences amongst the 'Asian' grouping has grown in importance as it has become increasingly obvious that settlers of differing backgrounds are following varied and often sharply contrasting social trajectories (Modood et al., 1997; Ramji, 2005) . The data presented were obtained by carrying out in-depth interviews with a sample of 20 young (18-30-year-old) British Asian Muslim men and women living in London. 3 As no random sampling frame exists for British South Asians the research relied on a snowball sample obtained through contacts made in the preliminary fieldwork stage of the project . 4 This consisted of participant observation amongst the London-based Muslim community over a period of six months. 5 The narratives were tape recorded with the permission of each participant and then transcribed. The transcripts were then analyzed using a thematic approach (Wetherell, 1998) . 6 The data are presented here under the three key themes of provider, modesty and relationships found in this analysis.
Before turning to the research findings it is useful to begin by outlining the popular stereotypes currently prevalent regarding Muslim men and women in Britain in order to demonstrate why a greater understanding is needed. The article then discusses how Bourdieu's concepts of capital and field can aid an analysis of relational difference. The remaining part of the article discusses the research respondents' interviews to highlight how strategies for negotiating British Muslim gender identities operated with different conceptions of Islam as capital and were intersected with other social differences, particularly class.
Fanatical Young Men?
The correlation is increasingly being made in both popular and wider perceptions between young Muslim men's religious identity and 'problem' status (Alexander, 2000; Ramji, 2005) . They continue to be stereotypically associated with a range of social problems. Asian Muslim male youth has been identified as consistently underperforming in both the education sector and the labour market (Brown, 2000; Dale et al., 2002; Modood et al., 1997; PIU, 2002) . Unemployment levels are up to five times those of white Britons. They are most likely to get the worst jobs, the lowest wage and face widespread discrimination. Even after allowances for education and residential area, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims are three times more likely to be jobless than Indian Hindus (PIU, 2002) . A new sense of danger also accompanies contemporary perceptions of these Muslim men. In their analysis of the 1995 public disturbances in Bradford, for instance, Burlet and Reid (1998) argue the incidents mark a change in Asian Muslim male behaviour in the public sphere from orderly protest to violence and disorder. This is related to the ongoing public and private violence perpetrated by such young men, which often centres on issues of control in the spheres of sexuality and gender. There is a polarized representation of Asian Muslim men as either Islamic fundamentalists or drugrelated criminals. Both depictions seem to rely on a male dominated and highly macho culture (Alexander, 2000; Macey, 1999; Ramji, 2005) . Attention has been given in recent years to how Muslim men curtail the freedom of the women in their communities as an exercise of patriarchal power (Macey, 1999; Ramji, 2005; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992) . This curtailment usually relies on the invoking of religiously derived 'modesty' laws to regulate women's movement and lifestyle choices.
7 Muslim men's 'unacceptable' behaviour is consistently read as an inevitable part of their cultural background and consequent culture clash with the mainstream British society (Taylor, 1976) . Religion is increasingly seen as the problem especially if you are Muslim. The sustained focus on Islam as the definer of self-identity has the effect of ossifying religious identity and obscuring the gendered, structural and racial positioning of Muslim communities, all of which impact on the interpretation of religion (Eade, 1996; Ramji, 2005) . This not only perpetuates an analysis of their inequality as different from the majority's experience of inequality but leads to the perception that their religion necessitates patriarchy without exploring the ways in which patriarchal gender relations may be subverted by the mobilization of religion. As Ramji (2003: 229) argues, 'by framing questions of culture as dichotomous and oppositional, traditional or Western, the clash of culture thesis fails to come to grips with the complex realities of South Asian [...] everyday lives'. Macey (1999: 845) similarly suggests that Burlet and Reid's (1998) analysis prioritizes 'cultural differences over gender, age, class location and religious affiliation' resulting in a 'sociologically inadequate analysis'.
Docile Young Women?
Research on Asian Muslim femininities continues to be somewhat eclipsed by the ongoing 'boys in crisis' debate (Ramji, 2005) . However, recent world events ranging from the high profile Rushdie affair of 1989 through to the British and American governments' declaration of the 'war on terror' after September 11 2001, have witnessed the emergence of a specific (albeit stereotypically limited) interest in Muslim women.
8 Against this backdrop of popular concern Asian Muslim women appear to occupy contradictory positions. They have been stereotypically represented as both exotic and sensual and as passive, repressed victims of their patriarchal cultures (Ramji, 2003) . Within education for example, Asian Muslim girls have been identified as causes for concern due to their persistent under-representation in post-compulsory education (Rattansi, 1992; Shain, 2002) . As Shain (2002) argues, the patriarchal Asian Muslim community is assumed to be responsible for Muslim girls' educational failure. The discourse of cultural pathology positions Asian Muslim femininities as inherently troubled and problematic. There has been a recent effort to move the analysis of Asian women beyond this victimology paradigm (Puwar and Raghuram, 2003; Ramji, 2003) . Ramji (2003) , for example, argues against the popular notion that Asian women are oppressed and damaged due to having to negotiate between two opposing worlds of home and work and she criticizes the idea that Asian women lack choice and freedom in their lives. Attention is brought to bear on the Eurocentric and racist assumptions that underpin notions of 'normal' (heterosexual) femininity against which Muslim women are judged to be 'different'. These writers demonstrate the ways in which Asian women are actively involved in producing identities that cut across cultural spheres and involve complex struggles over different modes of being. This article wishes to contribute to this literature by analysing some of the ways in which inequalities of racism, sexism and social class interact within the lives of the female respondents and their negotiation of religion in relation to these circumstances. This article argues specifically that representations of Asian Muslim masculinity are integrally linked with discourses of Asian Muslim femininity. Thus, increasing public fears about Muslim masculinity directly contribute to stereotypical notions of passive, controlled, oppressed and exploited Asian Muslim femininity.
Bourdieu: Fields and Capital
Bourdieu's work on social fields and capital aids this relational understanding of 'difference'. He conceptualized competing yet related struggles over a range of scarce goods and resources (1977, 1990) . These goods and resources are conceived of as four types of capital: economic, class roughly in the Marxist sense; cultural, legitimate knowledge and behaviour; social, the prestige and influence gained and enjoyed through networks with significant others; and symbolic, which in essence is constituted through the legitimate acknowledgement and recognition by others that someone has acquired one or more of the previous forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1987: 3-4) . To understand the specific relationships that develop as individuals and groups compete over particular forms of capital, Bourdieu introduced the concept of 'field'. A field is primarily defined by the particular forms of capital perceived as present and valuable. As Bourdieu (1993: 73 , with emphasis in the original) explains:
The structure of the field is a state of the power relations among agents or institutions engaged in the struggle, or, to put it another way, a state of the distribution of the specific capital which has been accumulated in the course of previous struggles and which orients subsequent strategies.
There are many different forms of capital whose significance can never be guaranteed. Rather, particular forms of capital will be highly valued within certain fields but will be devalued and used to signify subordinate status in other fields. Moreover, because of the different forms of capital that exist, we can conceive of a wide range of distinct fields, each organized around particular forms of capital. It is precisely this diversity in the forms of capital and their associated fields that aids our understanding of the multiple and contradictory nature of any individual's identity as they move from one field of relations to another (Connolly, 2000) . The young people interviewed differed in their relation to the social field of religion because of their gendered social positioning and this led to a differing evaluation of the capital present and desired. The qualities of their shared religion were perceived differently and a struggle at an intra-group level was occurring to establish possession of the most sought-after gendered religious identity. Both genders were concerned with defining and acquiring the Islamic cultural capital that they considered most valuable to them. In relation to this article we can conceive of religiously legitimated gender identities as a type of cultural capital sought after by young Muslim men and women. The possession of a religiously sanctioned gender identity could in turn be transformed into other forms of capital. A Muslim woman in possession of high levels of cultural capital, as delivered through religion, was, for example, perceived to have greater access to a range of economic and social capital. A suspect religious identity would have the opposite effect within the community. Individual strategies in any social field are concerned with the preservation or improvement of positions with respect to the defining capital of the field. A distinction was developing between the men and women interviewed regarding the conceptualization of what Muslim identity was and consequently what codes of behaviour this entailed. The identification of certain social codes as being important to success resonates with Bourdieu's theory that certain attributes or habituses operate as symbolic and cultural capital, which qualify people to rise in given social fields. The boundaries of any particular field in terms of the nature of the capital present and who and what are drawn into its domain are not fixed but are strongly contested by those within the field. The respondents accordingly drew differing boundaries regarding appropriate behaviour for Muslim men and women.
Muslim Masculinities
Both genders recognized that men currently enjoyed greater status within the British Asian Muslim community. The women interviewed saw this as rooted in a misinterpretation of Islam by patriarchal structures. The overarching theme in the men's interviews, however, was the utilization of religion to safeguard and legitimate their dominant position in the Muslim community. This was done through three (often contradictory) narratives of 'providers', 'modesty' and 'relationships'.
The majority of men interviewed cited 'providing' for dependants as a key part of their duty as Muslim men. They cited many phrases from the Qur'an and Hadith in support of this. Economic provision seemed particularly important. It was their responsibility as Muslim men to 'bring in the money', 'provide a roof over their family's heads' and 'look after their wives'. As Irfan, a 24-yearold bank employee, makes clear:
It's part of a Muslim man's duty to make sure he has the skills to provide for his family.
Faizal, a 26-year-old insurance administrator, echoes this:
Islam makes it very clear that it is the man's responsibility to work. If he fails in this, he is failing a religious duty.
Moreover, their ability to provide was directly related to the duty of Muslim men to enable Muslim women to observe Islamic 'modesty'. Observing modesty was most commonly associated with 'covering up', particularly wearing a headscarf or the hijab and practising purdah, a separation of the genders. The goal of modesty was to avoid unwanted male attention and improper (sexual) behaviour. A key way of enabling Muslim women to observe modesty was abstaining from public sphere activity, particularly waged employment. Modesty was in all cases seen as the duty of Muslim women. However, the ability to observe it was contingent on how successful men were in their perceived Islamic role as providers, as this determined the necessity of their female relatives working. As Mohammed, a 30-year-old administrator, notes:
Islam gives a man very specific duties, you have to be the one who goes out to work and mix with different sorts of people. You should be able to allow your wife to observe modesty rules, and keep her safe from all of this.
Azam, a 21-year-old factory worker, concurs:
A real man wouldn't need his wife, or sister to go out and work. It's his responsibility. It's harem (un-Islamic) to have the women in your family working.
Islam then, was seen as providing different roles for men and women. Each role was mutually dependent. Farukh, a 28-year-old supermarket manager, elaborates:
Women can't work as hard as men, our religion recognizes this and there isn't the expectation that women should work. Their real role is in the family and Islam makes sure that they can concentrate their efforts here by giving them specific modesty roles.
Women's ability to exercise modesty, as interpreted here by the male interviewees, was seen as a reflection on how successful they were as Muslim men and how much Islamic gendered capital they possessed. Moreover, Muslim women who practised proper 9 Islamic modesty were assumed to share this interpretation and thus would not want to work. Muslim women were different from non-Muslim women because they needed men to provide the conditions to observe and protect their modesty. Islamic modesty in the British context was perceived as a way of challenging a lifestyle that encouraged females to make themselves as sexually attractive as possible. Wearing the hijab, or becoming a 'covered lady', was a way of overcoming this. However, 'covering up' was also recognized as reducing the possibility of public sphere activity:
A woman who is properly covered up is not going to be able to find a good job. Public sphere activity, particularly paid employment was seen by these young men as part of the Islamic capital that was exclusively available to them as Muslim men. Being a proper Muslim was intrinsically connected to a highly macho masculinity. There seemed to be a culture amongst the young men in which older boys were respected as 'brothers'. The men shared a set of attitudes, particularly towards Muslim women, which created a boundary around their religion as a cultural capital which gave them more status, and women less. It was clear that Islam was being mobilized to secure the basis of a superior status for Muslim men, a superiority not readily available in other aspects of their lives. British Asian Muslim men's status as a racial minority in structurally disadvantaged social positions is important to note here. The turn to religion as a way out of social deprivation is as old as analyses of class society, and the growing appeal of Islamism amongst young members of this community has been noted elsewhere (Glynn, 2002 ). An Islamic identity in which they enjoyed superiority was a powerful cultural capital for the Muslim men interviewed, which could counteract a lack of economic, social and symbolic capital in British society. The findings also raise important questions about the circumstances in which ethnic boundaries become more, or less, permeable and the affect of this on individuals' prioritization of particular elements of their identities. The respondents raise important considerations regarding the fluidity of ethnic group content and the resource aspect of ethnicity (Afshar and Maynard, 1994) . Religion could be a resource for securing a dominant gender identity. This was particularly important when access to other capital was limited because of racism and other prejudice. This was not straightforward, however, because the distinct role that Islam was interpreted as providing for women was a boundary marker of the whole Muslim community. 'Our women are different from yours' was a clear line of argument and was seen to sanction a different treatment of men and women. Whatever the form taken by religion in specific contexts, it is almost universally the case that it impacts disproportionately on women relative to men (Khan, 2003; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992) . This is partially a consequence of patriarchy. But it is also because all religions are concerned with the custodianship and transmission of faith and culture to subsequent generations and women are centrally involved in the primary socialization of children. Thus, it is not perhaps surprising that Muslim men place so much importance on questions of appropriate gender roles and behaviour (Shaw, 2000) , since all these operate to control women and circumscribe their freedom of choice.
The male respondents' definition of masculinity relied on using religion to legitimate their position as economic providers and a gendered division of labour that favoured them.
This version of masculinity was elusive given some respondents' precarious occupational standing. Nearly all the respondents had experienced periods of unemployment and many of the least qualified were 'between jobs' at the time of the interview. When asked how this hard line on 'provision' fitted in with his own circumstances, Sajjid, an unemployed 19-year-old manual worker replied:
There is no excuse for neglecting your duties as a Muslim man... I may not be working with a proper contract [...] but I do stuff that earns me enough money to support my family.
It was later made clear to me that this 'stuff' was not only illegal but in breach of Islamic codes of behaviour. This would support Macey's (1999) observations regarding the contradictory appropriation of Muslim identity by young British Asian men. To secure the capital they perceived to be available exclusively to Muslim men who were successful 'providers' they were prepared to engage in activities which were in contravention of Islamic laws as understood by other members of their community.
It is important to interpret this against the backdrop of Asian Muslim women currently surpassing their male counterparts in educational and occupational achievements (Dale et al., 2002) . Class is an important way in which gender is constituted, but is often neglected in analysis of Muslim women's identity (Ramji, 2003) . There is evidence, too, that young Muslim men's reaction to the growing educational divide between themselves and Muslim women takes the form of harassment against both female higher education students and their parents (Macey, 1999) . There was a clear anxiety that women may be outperforming them in these contexts and this had repercussions for their masculinity (see McDowell, 2004 , for an analysis of class and white masculinity). Class seemed to influence how this was voiced. The working-class Muslim men interviewed had less access to economic capital, so relied on religion to give them access to a cultural capital, which could then be converted to other capital such as social, or indeed economic if it created a situation where only men are allowed to work. The men's utilization of Islam to control women's behaviour demonstrated the association respondents made between their role as males within the Islamic faith community and more specifically as providers and protectors of Muslim women. A large section of the working-class sample mobilized an interpretation of 'Islamic' teaching to argue against the education and employment of women. A narrow definition of gender was given:
Women only need to be educated in Islam, and this they can do at home. They don't need to have lots of education, like a degree [...] well because it's the man's job to earn a living and look after his wife [...] they won't have to work. (Azam, a 21-yearold factory worker) However, the middle-class respondents in the sample did not interpret their religion in the same way. They utilized religious doctrine to reinforce their interpretation of masculinity, which was more imbibed with white middle-class norms. They were married or aspired to marry women who had similar levels of social, economic and cultural capital to themselves. Tariq, a 28-year-old pharmacist, makes this clear:
There is nothing in Islam that means that women can't work. As long as they observe modesty laws they can do whatever they like... There's a difference in the type of work of course [...] it's not right for a Muslim women to be a fashion model for example [...] where she earns money by showing off her body.
Indeed, a suitably employed wife could enhance a Muslim man's cultural capital and community status:
I would be proud of my wife if she had a good job, it would reflect well on me. (Imran, a 23-year-old medical student)
Middle-class men's masculinity, as derived from Islam as capital, is enhanced by a working wife who simultaneously observes her religion.
Alongside the themes of provision and modesty in the respondents' interviews was the connected narrative of 'relationships'. The Asian Muslim masculinity evidenced in the interviews placed a high level of attachment to displays of heterosexual prowess. The mobilization of Islamic modesty was used by the men (all of whom displayed heterosexual identities), to decipher which girls deserved respect and were 'sisters' and which girls could be approached for 'a date'.
If you see girls going around by themselves and going out with their friends, or wearing Western clothing then they've already been given more freedom by their parents. So you know that they are not strictly brought up... it's these sorts of girls which are OK to go out with. (Sajjad, a 22-year-old student)
The men operated with a paradoxical dichotomy where the girls they found attractive were precisely those 'immodest' girls they 'would not' marry. Muslim men's masculinity, like most hegemonic masculinity, was intimately connected to heterosexuality (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005) . Furthermore, the display of Muslim men's possession of high status masculinity is reliant on 'going out' with girls.
I think a man should experience a bit of life before he settles down as a husband and has a family. I mean one of you in a marriage should be worldly wise. (Imitiaz, a married 28-year-old bank clerk) Again this contravenes dominant Islamic teaching, which cautions against sexual contact between the genders outside marriage. The mobilization of religion to support this construction of masculinity was used not only to construct a distinction between modest/immodest girls, but also the conceptualization that non-Muslim girls were legitimate targets of their amorous attentions. Greatest status was attached to 'going out' with girls outside of their Muslim community. 'White' girls were seen as the most promiscuous and thus 'easy' as girlfriends to 'score with'. Hindu and Sikh girls were a way of 'getting one up' on Sikh and Hindu boys, an old adversary. Again there was a high level of contradiction in this aspect of Muslim men's identity. The attitude of the men towards the 'immodest' women they dated was derogatory. Yet it was this femininity that defined their masculinity as much as the 'modesty' of their 'own' women. Again it was religion which defined the modest and immodest distinction the men used to distinguish which females were acceptable to date and which were not. This is turn was used to secure themselves the Islamic capital which made such sexual behaviour permissible only for them and not women. Any Muslim women behaving in this way would become immodest and disqualify herself from having the gendered Islamic capital as defined by these men.
This construction of Muslim masculinity silences Muslim women's sexuality and right to 'experience life' by dating men before marriage. This dichotomy is patrolled by the perception of a women's sexuality as representative of an entire family's 'izzat' or honour (Shaw, 2000) , while masculinity is differently constructed. The 'boys will be boys' attitude enabled the men to construct a religious identity which placed fewer restrictions on them and less of an onus on them to 'safeguard' their religion. Their masculinity is frequently used as an excuse to get out of the most demanding aspects of Islam and simultaneously to deserve the most prestigious rewards, as the following extract makes clear: The Muslim male respondents' conception of their religion securing them a superior status in their community relied on Muslim women accepting this version of Islam (and the gender-specific responsibilities it entailed). The discussion below, however, shows that this was not the case. It suggests the presence of a more complex model of gender hierarchy (as outlined by Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005) , emphasizing the agency of women and recognition of internal contradictions in the distribution of power and privilege.
Muslim Femininities
The gendered religious identity constructed by the young men discussed above contained a high level of contradiction -a contradiction which was highly functional in its facilitation of dual standards. Islam was mobilized as a form of capital that justified Asian Muslim men's dominant community position and women's subordinate one. Possession of a religiously sanctioned gendered identity was sought to justify power inequality. These aspects of male behaviour and their control function were clearly recognized and resented by young Asian Muslim women. The female respondents interviewed were concerned with challenging dominant interpretations of Islam to empower women and secure more 'religious' cultural capital for them. The themes of provision, modesty and relationships are used again to present the respondents' discussions.
Many of the women interviewed were either studying or working and were concerned with establishing greater 'religious' cultural capital for themselves as Muslim women. More specifically, they were concerned with establishing educated and working women as evidence of Islamic religiosity; this was a counterdiscourse to Muslim men's discourse on 'provision'.
Our religion says knowledge is the biggest thing that you could ever have, so the more education you have the better. (Hafiza, a 22-year-old student) Nazrana, a 28-year-old bank worker, similarly comments:
There's nothing un-Islamic about going out to work and getting a degree. That's just what Muslim men have been saying to keep women in their place.
There was awareness amongst the female respondents that Asian Muslim women were experiencing greater educational and occupational mobility then their male counterparts and would soon establish themselves as the better of the genders at 'providing'. This is a trend that recent research has highlighted (Dale et al., 2002) . The acquisition of mainstream economic (as well as cultural and symbolic) capital was being used as a power resource to secure religiously based cultural capital. This capital in turn was sought to enhance the position of women amongst the Asian Muslim community. A Muslim man's identity based on provision is being challenged here by the women's assertions that they can provide for themselves and that this is proper Islamic practice. The women seemed to utilize the community's perception of them as symbolic boundary markers to their advantage. They asserted that educated and working Muslim women who could provide for themselves were the best thing for the community because this demonstrated the true egalitarian attributes of Islam. Making the most of the available education and employment opportunities was a way of being a better Muslim and creating a more inclusive British Muslim community.
I don't think you should have to rely on a man, whether that is your husband, brother or father to provide for you. You should be able to look after yourself. Because when you are independent and not reliant on others you are true to yourself and have a freedom to practise Islam as you want. (Shanaz, 27-year-old administrator)
The women can be interpreted as being actively involved in a strategy of self-advancement (for themselves, their families and their communities). In contrast to the simplistic notion of a traditional-Western dichotomy, the research draws attention to how these women were actively transforming (rather than outright resisting) 'home' cultures. The problem was not with their religion rather how it had been (mis)interpreted. For these women it was their generation's responsibility to get this message out to the wider community. Hamida, a 29-year-old doctor, makes this point:
The inequality between [Muslim] men and women that people just accept has no foundation in the Qur'an. It is actually a very un-Islamic practice. Islam is about all believers being equal. Naseema, a 23-year-old law student, concurs:
I know what my religion says about women, and it's that we are equal.
The respondents were able to distinguish between patriarchal cultural practices and Islamic teaching. They were not about to abandon Islam, rather to reclaim it for Muslim women. Possession of this Islamic cultural capital was, as it was for the male respondents, an important identity resource in a racialized and classed British society.
Education was not simply seen in terms of the British education system and public sphere activity but also in terms of engaging with Islamic texts. Reading original texts, they claimed, gave them a better insight into the gender equality advocated by the Qur'an than that allowed by any Imam's prejudiced interpretation. This is not to imply that knowledge of the Qur'an automatically guarantees women the right to practise accordingly, since culture/tradition can prevail over religious teaching. It is, however, the case that religious knowledge, like knowledge more generally, constitutes a potential power resource that can sometimes be drawn on to achieve particular purposes. Often, these women could utilize their knowledge of Islam, thus their capital as good Muslim women, to attain other social and economic capital, like a university education and waged employment. Hafiza, a 28-year-old pharmacist, illustrates this well. It had taken her two years of intense pressure on her parents before she was allowed to attend university; she eventually won her case by constant illustration of the Qur'anic requirement to fulfill one's human potential. Other respondents succeeded in deferring marriage on the same basis.
It has been noted in other contexts (Khan, 2003; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992) , that a woman's 'empowerment' by religion has its limitations. But the respondents here seemed to be rearticulating what their religion was and using this to reset the parameters of acceptable behaviour for themselves as Muslim women. This is made clear in discussions regarding modesty. Internal religiosity was interpreted as more important then external symbolization in the quest for Islamic modesty. All the female respondents were especially critical about conventional (patriarchal) interpretations of modesty amongst the British Asian Muslim community. They were resentful of how this modesty was used to restrict their behaviour and simultaneously guarantee men more freedom.
The men who are putting pressure on women to stay at home and behave as 'good' Muslim women are the same ones involved in discos, drink, drugs and white women. (Tazneem, Observing Islamic teachings on modesty is not about covering yourself head to toe, but about being humble. Are you telling me that these men, who think they are so much better than women, know about being humble? I don't think so! (Fatima, Modesty for the majority of these women was not about what you wore, who you socialized with, rather the meaning behind your actions. Modesty is about 'not having a big head', understanding that everything you have is 'but for the grace of Allah'. Men who suffer from a superiority complex regarding women were not adhering to religious teachings on modesty. Several of the respondents commented that the dominant idea of modesty as 'keeping women away' from 'real life', most significantly activities outside of the private sphere such as waged employment, 'suited men'.
Because they can't let us see what they're really up to, can they? (Fatima, The boundaries of being a 'good Muslim' were being drawn differently from the male respondents by these women, based on contrasting ideas of Islamic modesty derived from their different gendered positioning. Whilst the majority of the women believed that a woman should wear what she wanted, and some chose to wear a headscarf, they were very conscious of the pressure a women could come under to wear the hijab. As Naseema, a 23-year-old student, notes:
Covering up because a man tells you to, is not about Islam, it is about being scared.
Hafiza, a 28-year-old pharmacist, echoes this:
I don't have to cover up to prove to anyone that I am a proper, modest Muslim.
Some respondents even argued that that hijab could actually have the opposite to the desired affect by drawing unnecessary attention to women and hampering attempts at Islamic modesty. The hijab can cause 'people to stare', or wonder whether 'you think you're better' or 'more holy' than them. The respondents also pointed out that there were rules in Islam for male modesty, which were not observed. Muslim males were expected to dress modestly in clothing that did not emphasize their sexuality. The female respondents wanted women to have the same level of choice as afforded to men in observing Islamic modesty. Farhana, a 24-year-old sales assistant, captures this:
All Muslims are required to practise modesty, but how this is interpreted in clothing styles is not compulsory at all. It is left to the piety and taste of the individual. Modesty is not just about a freedom from vanity and showiness. It is decency and moderation in speech, manner, dress and total attitude and behaviour towards life.
Many of the women interviewed appeared to be constructing an aggressive femininity, which saw the roots of Muslim women's difficulties as Muslim men. Again class seemed to influence this. The working-class respondents seemed most vocal on this whilst the middle-class respondents were more restrained. Tahira, a 24-year-old factory worker, makes this clear in the following:
It's not British society that makes being a Muslim woman difficult, it's Muslim men [...] they don't know what being a Muslim is all about [...] all they're concerned with is making sure everyone only takes them seriously and ignores women.
As with the male respondents, it could be interpreted that those respondents with the least access to alternative capital were the most aggressive in their pursuit of securing Islamic cultural capital for themselves. This attitude towards Muslim men was also apparent in the women's discussion of relationships. The male respondents displayed an understanding of Muslim women's sexuality that did not correlate to the Muslim women's interviews:
These boys who only want to marry 'pure' girls are just kidding themselves. These girls don't exist... we are as likely to date as they are... Most of them are too scared to marry a real woman with opinions of her own, because she would be able to challenge them on everything. What these men don't understand is that we see them at school chasing girls, we see them wolf-whistling at good-looking girls and going out with whoever they want. At the same time they are telling us to stay at home, because it's our Islamic duty. I'll tell you what my Islam duty is, it's jihad (struggle) against injustice and this one rule for the boys and one rule for the girls is an injustice. I mean why would a Muslim woman of my generation settle for someone like that? (Shamim, a 28-year-old machinist) I will marry who I want and when I want. My parents are completely fine with that -they know that I don't do anything against my religion and so trust me to do the right thing. (Naseema, 23-year-old student)
Having a wife who can't get by without asking their husband everything makes that man feel good, like he's worth something, which is important to some men, because they don't have anything else. So this works well for them. Also if they have a religious wife, or at least one that is outwardly religious, it looks like the man is religious when actually he may not be at all. (Tahira, 24-year-old factory worker)
In their challenge of the conventional role of Islamic women, the female respondents were also challenging the rigid gender relations that the Muslim men interviewed thought of as normal.
South Asian Muslim women are generally seen as oppressed and rarely as active negotiators of cultural change. The overall oppressive effect on women's rights of religious fundamentalism has been well-documented in the literature (Khan, 2003; Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992) . When looking at women's resistance to religious oppression, it is important to examine not only organized efforts but individual women's agency in subverting or coopting these movements towards their own ends. The women interviewed crafted agency by responding to the demands of family and community through collaboration, acquiescence, cooption and subversion. These women faced a difficult negotiation: by standing up for their rights as women, they could appear to be disloyal to their religious community. The strategy of redefining perceptions of good Islamic practice to secure themselves greater cultural capital as Muslim women seemed to be an effective way of overcoming this.
Conclusion
This article has explored how religion is mobilized as a power resource in the construction of the gender identity of young British Asian Muslim men and women. It has suggested that the mobilization of religion is reflective of the type of Islam these young men and women perceived as most useful and valuable as capital in the social field they occupied as a result of their gendered positioning. The young people interviewed differed in their relation to the social field of religion because of their gendered social positioning and this led to a differing eval-uation of the capital present and desired. The qualities of their shared religion were perceived differently and a struggle at an intra-group level was occurring to establish possession of the most sought-after gendered religious identity. Both genders were concerned with defining and acquiring the Islamic cultural capital which they considered most valuable to them. There was considerable contestation about what constituted good Islamic behaviour amongst the men and women interviewed. Whilst the men mobilized Islam in their narratives of providers, modesty and relationships to legitimate their current dominance amongst the British Muslim community, the women used the same themes to challenge conventional understanding of their roles, in order to acquire greater status for themselves. In relation to this article we can conceive of religiously legitimated gender identities as a type of cultural capital sought after by young Muslim men and women. The possession of a religiously sanctioned gender identity in turn could be transformed into other forms of capital. Both genders recognized the importance of acquiring a religiously-legitimated gender identity as key to the acquisition of other capital. The research findings also suggest that the mobilization of religion is often ambivalent, contradictory and intersected with other social differences, particularly class. Bourdieu's framework enables an understanding of how possession of other capital, such as middle-class economic capital, influences perspectives on Islam as cultural capital.
6 On receipt of the transcripts I listened to the tape whilst scrutinizing the transcript to correct any errors. The transcripts were read for a second time whilst listening to the tape, and annotated with significant examples of emotion, changes of tone and emphasis, 'as emphasis, mood, intonation and so on, can crucially elaborate meaning' (Jones, 1985: 58) . Further analysis and annotation took place in subsequent readings by drawing out any references or inferences to religion and gender. Cross references could then be made between the comments and experiences of the participants, which were enhanced by 'focusing on the ways in which different people relate their experiences according to the circumstances they found themselves in' (May, 1997: 126) . In this way I could use theory to make sense of experience in an 'interpretative and synthesizing process, which connects experience to understanding' (Mayford, 1994: 24) . The themes discussed emerged from this analytical approach. 7 This is epitomized in the 'forced' marriage versus arranged marriage debate (Ramji, 2003) . 8 It is important to point out that most of this attention has been directed at exposing the cultural and religious oppression endured by Muslim women, epitomized most recently by the exposure of the Taliban's treatment of Afghan women, particularly the utilization of religious teaching to deny them access to education and equal legal status. 9 'Proper' Islamic gender identity is understood as a constructed concept and its operation in the social context is being analysed in this article.
